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Introduction
Do security incidents lead to increased military expenditure and lower investment in vital public services such as health care? The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provides an ideal context in which to examine this relationship. The region has been prone to conflict; high security needs and is home to six of the world's top ten highest military spending countries. In addition, policy-makers and academics are searching for explanations of the 2011 Arab uprisings or 'awakening' and trying to understand how public policy decisions are made in the region. A more nuanced understanding of the policy-making process in the region, it is argued, could help in more effective targeting of external donor funding for development and humanitarian assistance.
The widespread policy and academic view is that in a region renowned for protracted conflicts and terrorism MENA policy-makers have prioritized military and security expenditures, which has led to the subsequent neglect of wider public policy and social welfare, such as education and health, thereby increasing poverty and inequalities and creating the social and economic conditions for social unrest. It is argued that over the last forty years, Arab populations had accepted the 'authoritarian bargain' and the associated militarization of societies in return for domestic security at the expense of their social welfare and social mobility. However, the existing evidence is equivocal about the determinants of this relationship. The majority of studies have focused on OECD countries and provide mixed findings. Only a handful of studies have been identified in the MENA region, which find that increased military expenditure crowdsout welfare spending on health and crowds-in spending on education.
In this paper, panel data for 18 MENA countries is collated from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Security needs are estimated using data on casualties resulting from terrorist attacks (number of deaths and serious injuries). This is retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Previous studies on the MENA region have not considered security incidents as a potential driver of military expenditure. In contrast to existing studies of the military social welfare expenditure nexus that focus on OECD countries and use simple correlation analysis, we
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provide an analytical framework based on regression analysis and the Panel Vector Auto Regressive model (PVAR) to systematically explore the trade-off between military and public health expenditures.
Using panel data from 1995-2011-the eve of the Arab uprisings-we find no evidence that increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks are complemented by increased military spending and thereby 'crowd-out' and reduce government expenditure on key public goods such as health care. We validate these findings with four additional modeling approaches: Generalized methods of moments (GMM), Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), instrumental variable regressions, and Granger causality tests. The results indicate that, in the pre-Arab Spring period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , military expenditures did not lead to a decline in public health spending in the MENA region, which suggests that both expenditure decisions were determined by other considerations at the government level. Our results show that claims about the 'warfare versus welfare / guns versus butter' hypotheses in the MENA are not so straightforward as many political scientists and regional commentators would like to believe. This relationship and the potential causes of the Arab uprisings require a far more nuanced and evidence-based understanding of decision-making and the political economy of policy-making in the region.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we review the results from the literature on the guns and butter trade-off. In Section 3, we present some stylized facts on the military spending in the MENA region. In Section 4, we discuss the data and econometric methodology. In Section 5, we present the empirical findings while results from robustness checks are relegated to the supplemental appendix. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
Evidence of 'Guns versus Butter'
Empirical evidence linking military and social expenditures assumes that defense spending is increased at the cost of other forms of public expenditure and concludes that "guns do come at the expense of butter" (Russett, 1969) . The guns versus butter nexus defines a potential trade-off between military and social spending (e.g. public health, public education, welfare, etc.). The conclusion of Russett (1969 Russett ( , 1982 confirms what was, at the time, a widely held belief that spending on health and education is
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negatively affected by military expenditure, particularly during times of conflict. Russett's (1969) analysis is based on US spending between 1939-68 alongside France and the UK, which returned similar results. However, in studying Canada, Russett (1969) returned a positive set of results and so paved the way for an array of literature and analysis over 50 years, which has not led to a universal consensus for or against the 'gun vs butter' hypothesis. For instance, Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) employ a SUR model in an effort to elucidate the relationship between military and social expenditures, focusing only on Turkey between 1924 and 1996. In line with the original theory, they also conclude that a trade-off exists between health and military spending; by contrast education spending indicated a positive relationship with military spending.
They also propose that there is a sequential funding of health and education once military expenditure has been allocated. This idea was earlier discussed by Deger (1985) who had issued a warning that notoriously elusive endogenous expenditure decisions should be afforded priority when investigating the trade-off. 1 The military-welfare trade-off has been documented in a number of studies following Russett's (1969) seminal work (e.g. Peroff and Podolak-Warren, 1979; Deger, 1985; Apostolakis, 1992, among others) . Russett (1982) utilized time series analysis of the US case from 1941-71 in which he found that no relationship exists between social spending and military spending. Furthermore, Verner (1983) examined 18 Latin American countries in a time series analysis with linear and non-linear regression models and found that only in El Salvador there was a trade-off, in seven countries there was no trade-off, whilst in 10 countries a positive relationship was observed. It is clear that the the extant literature includes numerous analyses using a variety of methodologies in an effort to uncover conclusive evidence on the military-social tradeoff. Moreover, the applied methodologies have, necessarily, become more nuanced and complex.
The post-Cold War era has not as yet provided a rich mine of evidence for the militarysocial trade-off, particularly in direct comparison to the Cold war era; Neuman (1994) suggests the complexity of analysis now required is a significant factor in its paucity. 2 Combining cross-sectional and panel data is recommended by Lin et al. (2015) Israel is the only Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region country to be included in the analysis despite many neighbouring countries in the region reporting higher numbers of security incidents than Israel, as well as the fact that six of the world's top ten military spenders (percentage of GDP) are located in the MENA region (See Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 near here] Finally, Elbadawi and Keefer (2014) examine the determinants of military expenditures in 140 countries using pooled OLS regression. They find that rising military spending in 2 Within the broader literature on the role of military expenditure, mixed evidence is found about the role of military expenditure and economic growth (Dunne, 1996; Dunne et al., 2005; Dunne and Tian, 2015; and d'Agostino et al., 2017) . 3 Reeves and Stuckler p.1. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid 3. 6 Ibid 3 the MENA region is mainly due to increased security risks in the region. However, as their focus is to understand the nexus of democratization, regional politics, and military expenses, they do not consider trade-offs between military and other types of expenditure.
Military spending in the MENA region
Looking at Table 1, in overall military expenditure, the global average is 1.9% of GDP with Saudi Arabia being the only MENA country registered in the top ten spenders in absolute terms. However, as a percentage share of GDP, MENA countries occupy six of the top ten positions worldwide (UN-ESCWA, 2014: 137; SIPRI, 2014) . Oman tops the list at 10.84% of GDP while Saudi Arabia spends 8.52% of its GDP. In terms of global priorities, countries tend to spend the most on education followed by health and then the military. In the MENA region, the priority is also education, but the trend has been that of high spending on military and health; underlined by the fact that the MENA countries surpassed the global average on both (UN-ESCWA 2013 : 15, 2014 . Gaub (2014) states that "had Arab States adjusted their military budgets to European levels in 1990-and maintained them-their economies would have grown by 2-3 per cent a year, and generated output levels over 50 per cent higher than at present." expenditure and health spending. These studies comment that providing explanations and a conceptual framework for the findings is difficult. A variety of pathways could be considered. First, the unstable and conflict-prone environment, which has come to dominate the region, has provided the opportunity for elites and policy-makers to justify increased security and military spending, ostensibly to curtail internal 'terrorist' threats, predominantly from militant organizations. Second, Ali (2012) argues that across the region the military and security services are so endemic within all aspects of a society and public services, which makes it challenging for researchers to extrapolate where exactly military spending begins and ends. For instance, which government entity deals with security incidents and counter-terrorism efforts? In many MENA countries this is usually managed by the security services, not the military. This makes analysis of military spending challenging as it is difficult to disaggregate and know how much of it is linked to counter-terrorism rather than traditional defense. Government spending on military and social welfare may also be influenced by the foreign policies of external international powers and associated donor agencies such as USAID, which aim to secure regional political stability at the expense of economic development and the social protection and wellbeing of domestic populations (UN-ESCWA 2013; Cammett et al., 2015; Daoud et al. 2017 ).
Data and econometric model

Data
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by Ali (2011 Ali ( , 2012 and Bauwens Ali (2012) recommends that in the analysis of the 'warfare versus welfare' hypothesis future studies should disaggregate social expenditures (education, health, food subsidies) in order to provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationship to military spending (cf. Nandy et al. 2016) In this article we therefore focus on health expenditure. Table 2 
Econometric model
We use a vector autoregressive model with panel data (PVAR) to take into account the unobserved country heterogeneity in line with Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) . The PVAR model, in contrast to the simple correlation test, fully exploits the panel data nature of our dataset by considering simultaneously time series and cross sectional dependencies. In addition to overcoming the inefficiency of the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE) models, this model does not suffer from the omitted-variable bias found in these models. Instead, the PVAR model assumes that all variables are endogenous. An additional advantage of the PVAR model is that it captures dynamic features by considering the lagged dependent variable among the covariates.
The first order PVAR model is represented as follows:
(1)
In equation (1) is a (3x1 In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose the restriction that the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is likely to be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow for 'individual heterogeneity' in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects. Since the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased coefficients. To avoid this problem we use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the 'Helmert procedure' (see Arellano and Bover, 1995) . This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year.
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This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors.
Before conducting the regression analysis, the statistical properties of the panel data used in the analysis are examined. We utilize three tests commonly adopted in the empirical literature to study the stationarity of the variables, which is a necessary step before estimating the relationships among the variables. This is done because using non-stationary variables may lead to spurious correlation. We run the panel versions of the classical Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) , the PhillipsPerron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988) , and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) [ Table 3 near here]
We explore additional models and methods often used in the literature in the supplemental appendix as a robustness check. We first run a SUR regression since researchers often use SUR to model trade-offs across different spending categories (e.g., Anderson and Blundell 1982; Ali 2011, Kiviet and Schipp 1995; Yildirim and Szegin 2002; Hessami 2014; Zellner 1962) . In our case, we are interested in the trade-off between health and military expenditure.
We thus run a system of two equations and allow for arbitrary cross-equation correlation to capture the impact of unobserved confounders that cause co-movement in both health and military expenditure. Terrorist attacks are considered an observable confounder. Second, we deploy in the appendix an instrumental variables framework in which the focal outcome is health expenditure and military spending is a potentially endogenous regressor. We introduce terrorism casualties as a plausible instrument for military expenditure, and use it to identify
the effect of military spending on health spending. Finally, we use a Granger causality test.
Here, we test if past spending of military spending can predict current health expenditure. Lin et al. (2015) who also use a regression analysis but for the OECD countries. Our results in Table 4 show that terrorist attacks and security incidents did not have any significant implications on the total health expenditure in the pre-Arab Spring period.
Empirical results
[ Table 4 near here]
The robustness analyses-outlined in the supplemental appendix-reinforce the main finding: military spending does not crowd-out health spending. In the SUR model, we find no evidence for terror casualties to affect either health or military expenditure. Furthermore, there is a residual positive (rather than negative as the guns-versus-butter trade-off would suggest) correlation between health and military expenditure due to unobserved factors. In the instrumental variables regression, we find no evidence that changes in or levels of military expenditure affects health expenditure cuts. Lastly, Granger causality tests do not indicate that health and military spending can be predicted by each other, neither in levels nor in differences. Overall, these results lend overwhelming support to our main conclusion.
Concluding remarks
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Many studies have explored the potential trade-off between military and social expenditures (see Zhang et al. 2016 for full review). Given the use of different methodologies, datasets and country contexts and histories, the evidence available is mixed. In this paper we attempted to address the methodological weaknesses found in previous studies and to provide new evidence from the MENA region, which contributes to shedding some light on potential drivers of the 2011 'Arab Spring' and the policy making process in the region.
We note one limitation of our study. A null-result does not prove the absence of a relationship. In other words, military spending might affect health spending via pathways that our models have not captured. It could be the case that if there was any crowding-out effect of health spending, it could have occurred in the past, pre-1995.
Given that the region has been conflict prone during the last century-such as civil war MENA countries. We thus consider that our study contributes to the bricolage of evidence from the region and provides additional insights to those of Ali (2011 Ali ( , 2012 and the guns versus butter evidence base more broadly. The results can help orientate future research to explore the un-modeled pathways in the guns-versus-butter nexus, particularly in the MENA region.
Our main finding is that the apparent trade-off reported between military and health spending is found to be spurious on the eve of the so-called Arab Spring (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) .
The analysis and results provide a cautionary note against the reliance on simple correlation analysis to draw important policy conclusions about the relationship between various government expenditures as reported elsewhere (See for example UN-ESCWA 2013). Academics and policy makers should be careful in assuming that models and results from studies such as those of the OECD can be transplanted onto another
region such as that of the MENA without consideration of historical experiences and political economy factors.
Determining the causes of unrest is a rather more complex empirical and policy task than envisioned by UN-ESCWA (2013) and those who claim there was an authoritarian bargain between MENA publics and their governments in order to maintain the status quo and security in a region beset by conflict (Desai et al., 2011) . Moreover, the results suggest that support of MENA governments for the military and security apparatus prior to the 'Arab Spring' did not seem to play a role in crowding-out health expenditures: a finding that is contrary to that proposed by Lin et al. (2013) .
Further our results compliment those of Ali and Abdellatif (2013) 
Number of observations 215
Notes: Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are lagged at order 1.
Supplemental appendix
To probe the robustness of our main findings, we present estimation results under alternative assumptions on the data-generating process. The models presented below are more specific than the PVAR models in the main text. A key concern is that with just 18 countries and 17 years in the sample, it is difficult to find significant results with too flexible estimators. Furthermore, the low number of observations limits us to a few additional tests. Following established practice and the results of our unit root tests, we estimate autoregressive distributed lag models in error correction representation throughout. In these models, the dependent variable is expressed in differences, while its lagged level is being controlled for.
We examine permutations of the following three dimensions:
 Data-generating process: We consider two alternative models that impose some structure upon the fully flexible PVAR model.
 Control variables:
We consider two sets of control variables-the empty set (as in the main text) and a set of basic controls, including (logged) terror casualties, infant mortality, and (logged) external resources for health.
 Dependent variables: We consider two dependent variables-(logged) health expenditure (% GDP) and (logged) out-of-pocket health expenditure (% health expenditure). 
A.1. Seemingly-unrelated regression
Our first set of additional robustness tests makes the simplifying assumption that changes in health expenditure and military expenditure are both outcomes of interest that can be individually studied, but unobserved 'third variables' can induce spurious correlation between these two outcomes. Terrorist attacks are assumed to be exogenous. This data-generating process can be conveniently modelled with a seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR) system.
In a SUR system, standard errors are allowed to correlate across equations. A positive correlation would indicate the presence of an unobserved factor that induces increases in both outcomes of interest, while a negative one indicates countervailing effects. For example, it is plausible to argue that a change in government ideology toward a more hawkish stance could decrease health expenses, whilst increasing military expenditure. The SUR framework allows us to detect cross-outcome correlation without the need to measure its sources. Table A2 presents the results when using health expenditure and military expenditure as our main dependent variables. Consistent with the main analysis, we find no evidence of crowding-out between health spending and military expenses. In fact, the cross-outcome correlation is estimated to be significantly positive (p<0.01). This suggests existence of an unmeasured variable that positively relates to both types of spending. For example, spending on police forces is a likely confounder. To avoid future terrorist attacks, the government likely spends on both military and the police force including its counterterrorism units.
Turning to control variables, we do not find evidence for significant relationships between terror casualties and health expenditure and military expenditure, respectively. In contrast, external resources for health substitute for domestic health spending as well as military spending (p<0.01). A higher lagged level of infant mortality is negatively related to the growth in health expenditure, most likely because states with problems to expedite health spending have weak state capacity to begin with. This interpretation-lack of absorptive capacity-is also consistent with the negative coefficient on the level of external resources for health in both equations. In sum, the models are reasonably specified, explaining about one-third of the variation in health expenditure change. Table A2 . SUR results using health expenditure Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Table A3 repeats the analysis from Table A2 but using out-of-pocket health expenditure as the first outcome of interest. The main conclusions from the analysis are unaffected. Conditional on observed control variables, both outcomes are not significantly correlated with each other (the point estimate is close to zero). The coefficients of terror casualties are not significant. In terms of additional controls, we find that an increase in the growth of external resources for health positively relates to an increase in the out-of-pocket share of health expenditure (p<0.01). This can again be taken as suggestive evidence that governments reduce public health expenditure when external resources are ready to fill the gap. Table A3 . SUR results with out-of-pocket health expenditure Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
A.2. A direct test of the crowding-out hypothesis
In a second set of analyses, we consider health expenditure as our unique outcome of interest and military expenditure to be a (potentially endogenous) regressor. This setup allows us to directly assess whether there is a significant negative correlation between the two variables (equivalent to a crowding-effect). We are not concerned about reverse causality as a source of endogeneity (a negative correlation is evidence of crowdingout). However, we must beware of endogeneity due to omitted variables. A standard solution to this is an instrumental-variable design, in which we try to find a variable that correlates with military expenditure but affects health expenditure only through its effect on the former.
Terror casualties are not an implausible instrument. Assuming that casualties are never significant enough to directly cause increases in public health spending, they are theoretically strongly related to military spending because governments can use terrorism as a pretext to reallocate scarce public resource to the military (Daoud 2011 (Daoud , 2017 (Daoud , 2018 . Our approach in this set of analyses hence is to instrument military spending with terror casualties and study whether (predicted) military spending is negatively related to health expenditure. Table A4 shows the results for health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. We find that there never is a significantly negative relationship between military spending and health expenditure (in fact, in the last two models, it is positive). Yet, we caution against over-interpretation of these findings because the instruments are weak, considering conventional levels of statistical significance. Neither are any of the control variables significant. Table A5 repeats the analysis using out-of-pocket health expenditure as outcome of interest. The results are similar, at the exception of the first model in which the coefficient on the level of military expenditure is negatively related to the change in health spending. This is not evidence of crowding-out though. Table A4 . IV design using health expenditure Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. Military expenditure is modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and differences as instruments. Models 1-2 instrument both level and difference in military expenditure. Models 3-4 only instrument the difference. All equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. Military expenditure is modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and differences as instruments. Models 1 (equivalent to A4) dropped due to nonconvergence. All equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
A.3. Granger causality test
A final test to demonstrate that health expenditure and military expenditure are not related to each other in our sample is a Granger causality test. For instance, if past realizations of military spending could predict current health expenditure (controlling for past health spending), but past realizations of health spending would not predict current military expenditure (controlling for its past realizations), then military spending Granger-causes health spending.
We do not find evidence for variable to Granger-cause the other, neither in levels, nor in changes (Table A6) . This is additional supportive evidence for our main finding that there is no crowding-out between the two variables. Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
